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The Honorable Pat Bartholomew
Clerk of the Court
Supreme Court of Utah
Matheson Courthouse, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

Armand L. Smith et al„ Appellees v. Utah State Treasurer, Additional
Rule 19 Defendant and Appellant.
AppealjMo. 20040675-SC

Dear Madam Clerk:
Pursuant to Utah Appellate Rule 24(i), the Appellees Smiths, through their record
counsel, herewith submit a Supplemental Authority which has come to our attention after
the Appellees' Brief was filed on December 14, 2004 and the State Treasurer's Reply Brief
filed on January 18, 2005. It is pertinent and significant to the above-referenced appeal
1.

Appellees at pp. 29-31 of their Brief, cite and analyze the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit decision in Banaitis v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003) with respect to the inclusion of
punitive damage awards, part of which was payable to the State of Oregon,
within the gross income, under the Alternative Minimum Tax, of the partytaxpayer securing the award. Appellees indicated that the Supreme Court
of the United States had granted certiorari to review the part of the decision
related to the inclusion of attorneys' fees as gross income under said tax.
The Appellant, State Treasurer, also discussed the
Banaitis decision in
Appellant's Reply Brief, pp. 16-19.
On January 24, 2005, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Banaitis, Sub. Norn. CommY. v.
125 S.Ct. 826 (2005) with respect to the dominion
Banks, 543 U.S.
and control of the litigation and the inclusion in gross income under the
Alternative Minimum Tax of attorneys' fees paid by the taxpayer securing the
compensatory and punitive damage award. See Attachment. The time for
filing a Petition for Rehearing has expired and the decision is final.

Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, P.C

Hon. Pat Bartholomew
March 7, 2005
Page 2
Without comment, the Banaitis decision of the U. S. Supreme Court is submitted to
the Court as Supplemental Authority.
A copy of this letter and Attachment is being served by mail on State Treasurer's
counsel.
Respectfully yours,

ROBERT S. CAMPBELL
JENNIFER ANDERSON WHITLOCK
Attorneys for Armand L. Smith and Virginia L.
Smith
RSC.kc
Enclosure
cc:

Kevin V. Olsen, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
James S Jardine, Esq.
Non-party counsel

(Slip Opinion)
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Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done m connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. BANKS
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-892. Argued November 1, 2004—Decided January 24, 2005*
Respondent Banks settled his federal employment discrimination suit
against a California state agency and respondent Banaitis settled his
Oregon state case against his former employer, but neither included
fees paid to their attorneys under contingent-fee agreements as gross
income on their federal income tax returns. In each case petitioner
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a notice of deficiency,
which the Tax Court upheld. In Banks' case, the Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding that the amount Banks paid to his attorney
was not includable as gross income. In Banaitis' case, the Ninth Circuit found that because Oregon law grants attorneys a superior lien
in the contingent-fee portion of any recovery, that part of Banaitis*
settlement was not includable as gross income.
Held: When a litigant's recovery constitutes income, the litigant's income includes the portion of the recovery paid to the attorney as a
contingent fee. Pp. 5-12.
(a) Two preliminary observations help clarify why this issue is of
consequence. First, taking the legal expenses as miscellaneous itemized deductions would have been of no help to respondents because
the Alternative Minimum Tax establishes a tax liability floor and
does not allow such deductions. Second, the American Jobs Creation
Act of 2004—which amended the Internal Revenue Code to allow a
taxpayer, in computing adjusted gross income, to deduct attorney's
fees such as those at issue—does not apply here because it was
passed after these cases arose and is not retroactive. Pp. 5-6.
* Together with No. 03-907, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Banaitis, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit.
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(b) The Code defines "gross income" broadly to include all economic
gains not otherwise exempted. Under the anticipatory assignment of
income doctrine, a taxpayer cannot exclude an economic gain from
gross income by assigning the gain in advance to another party, e.g.,
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. I l l , because gains should be taxed "to those
who earn them," id., at 114. The doctrine is meant to prevent taxpayers from avoiding taxation through arrangements and contracts
devised to prevent income from vesting in the one who earned it. Id.,
at 115. Because the rule is preventative and motivated by administrative and substantive concerns, this Court does not inquire whether
any particular assignment has a discernible tax avoidance purpose.
Pp. 6-7.
(c) The Court agrees with the Commissioner that a contingent-fee
agreement should be viewed as an anticipatory assignment to the attorney of a portion of the client's income from any litigation recovery.
In an ordinary case attribution of income is resolved by asking
whether a taxpayer exercises complete dominion over the income in
question. However, in the context of anticipatory assignments, where
the assignor may not have dominion over the income at the moment
of receipt, the question is whether the assignor retains dominion over
the income-generating asset. Looking to such control preserves the
principle that income should be taxed to the party who earns the income and enjoys the consequent benefits. In the case of a litigation
recovery the income-generating asset is the cause of action derived
from the plaintiffs legal injury. The plaintiff retains dominion over
this asset throughout the litigation. Respondents' counterarguments
are rejected. The legal claim's value may be speculative at the moment of the assignment, but the anticipatory assignment doctrine is
not limited to instances when the precise dollar value of the assigned
income is known in advance. In these cases, the taxpayer retained
control over the asset, diverted some of the income produced to another party, and realized a benefit by doing so. Also rejected is respondents' suggestion that the attorney-client relationship be treated
as a sort of business partnership or joint venture for tax purposes. In
fact, that relationship is a quintessential principal-agent relationship, for the client retains ultimate dominion and control over the
underlying claim. The attorney can make tactical decisions without
consulting the client, but the client still must determine whether to
settle or proceed to judgment and make, as well, other critical decisions. The attorney is an agent who is duty bound to act in the principal's interests, and so it is appropriate to treat the full recovery
amount as income to the principal. This rule applies regardless of
whether the attorney-client contract or state law confers any special
rights or protections on the attorney, so long as such protections do

Cite as: 543 U. S.
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not alter the relationship's fundamental principal-agent character.
The Court declines to comment on other theories proposed by respondents and their amid, which were not advanced in earlier stages of
the litigation or examined by the Courts of Appeals. Pp. 7-10.
(d) This Court need not address Banks' contention that application
of the anticipatory assignment principle would be inconsistent with
the purpose of statutory fee-shifting provisions, such as those applicable in his case brought under 42 U. S. C. §§1981, 1983, and 2000(e)
et seq. He settled his case, and the fee paid to his attorney was calculated based solely on the contingent-fee contract. There was no courtordered fee award or any indication in his contract with his attorney
or the settlement that the contingent fee paid was in lieu of statutory
fees that might otherwise have been recovered. Also, the American
Jobs Creation Act redresses the concern for many, perhaps most,
claims governed by fee-shifting statutes. P. 11.
No. 03-892, 345 F. 3d 373; No. 03-907, 340 F. 3d 1074, reversed and
remanded.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other
Members joined, except REHNQUIST, C. J., who took no part in the decision of the cases.
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Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 03-892 and 03-907

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
PETITIONER
03-892
v.
JOHN W. BANKS, II
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
PETITIONER
03-907
v.
SIGITAS J. BANAITIS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[January 24, 2005]

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in these consolidated cases is whether the
portion of a money judgment or settlement paid to a plaintiffs attorney under a contingent-fee agreement is income
to the plaintiff under the Internal Revenue Code, 26
U. S. C. §1 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. I). The issue divides the courts of appeals. In one of the instant cases,
Banks v. Commissioner, 345 F. 3d 373 (2003), the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held the contingent-fee portion of a litigation recovery is not included in the plaintiffs
gross income. The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits also adhere to this view, relying on the
holding, over Judge Wisdom's dissent, in Cotnam v. Com-
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missioner, 263 F. 2d 119, 125-126 (CA5 1959). Srivastava
v. Commissioner, 220 F. 3d 353, 363-365 (CA5 2000);
Foster v. United States, 249 F. 3d 1275, 1279-1280 (CA11
2001). In the other case under review, Banaitis v. Commissioner, 340 F. 3d 1074 (2003), the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that the portion of the recovery
paid to the attorney as a contingent fee is excluded from
the plaintiffs gross income if state law gives the plaintiffs
attorney a special property interest in the fee, but not
otherwise. Six Courts of Appeals have held the entire
litigation recovery, including the portion paid to an attorney as a contingent fee, is income to the plaintiff. Some of
these Courts of Appeals discuss state law, but little of
their analysis appears to turn on this factor. Raymond v.
United States, 355 F. 3d 107, 113-116 (CA2 2004); Kenseth
v. Commissioner, 259 F. 3d 881, 883-884 (CA7 2001);
Baylin v. United States, 43 F. 3d 1451, 1454-1455 (CA
Fed. 1995). Other Courts of Appeals have been explicit
that the fee portion of the recovery is always income to the
plaintiff regardless of the nuances of state law. O'Brien v.
Commissioner, 38 T. C. 707, 712 (1962), aff d, 319 F. 2d
532 (CA3 1963) (per curiam); Young v. Commissioner, 240
F. 3d 369, 377-379 (CA4 2001); Hukkanen-CampfceZZ v.
Commissioner, 274 F. 3d 1312, 1313-1314 (CA10 2001).
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 541 U. S. 958
(2004).
We hold that, as a general rule, when a litigant's recovery constitutes income, the litigant's income includes the
portion of the recovery paid to the attorney as a contingent
fee. We reverse the decisions of the Courts of Appeals for
the Sixth and Ninth Circuits.
I
A. Commissioner v. Banks
In 1986, respondent John W. Banks, II, was fired from
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his job as an educational consultant with the California
Department of Education. He retained an attorney on a
contingent-fee basis and filed a civil suit against the employer in a United States District Court. The complaint
alleged employment discrimination in violation of 42
U. S. C. §§1981 and 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., and Cal.
Govt. Code Ann. §12965 (West 1986). The original complaint asserted various additional claims under state law,
but Banks later abandoned these. After trial commenced
in 1990, the parties settled for $464,000. Banks paid
$150,000 of this amount to his attorney pursuant to the
fee agreement.
Banks did not include any of the $464,000 in settlement
proceeds as gross income in his 1990 federal income tax
return. In 1997 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
issued Banks a notice of deficiency for the 1990 tax year.
The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's determination,
finding that all the settlement proceeds, including the
$150,000 Banks had paid to his attorney, must be included
in Banks' gross income.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in
part. 345 F. 3d 373 (2003). It agreed the net amount
received by Banks was included in gross income but not
the amount paid to the attorney. Relying on its prior
decision in Estate of Clarks v. Commissioner, 202 F. 3d
854 (2000), the court held the contingent-fee agreement
was not an anticipatory assignment of Banks' income
because the litigation recovery was not already earned,
vested, or even relatively certain to be paid when the
contingent-fee contract was made. A contingent-fee arrangement, the court reasoned, is more like a partial
assignment of income-producing property than an assignment of income. The attorney is not the mere beneficiary
of the client's largess, but rather earns his fee through
skill and diligence. 345 F. 3d, at 384-385 (quoting Estate

4

COMMISSIONER v. BANKS
Opinion of the Court

of Clarks, supra, at 857-858). This reasoning, the court
held, applies whether or not state law grants the attorney
any special property interest {e.g., a superior hen) in part
of the judgment or settlement proceeds.
B. Commissioner v. Banaitis
After leaving his job as a vice president and loan officer
at the Bank of California in 1987, Sigitas J. Banaitis
retained an attorney on a contingent-fee basis and brought
suit in Oregon state court against the Bank of Cahfornia
and its successor in ownership, the Mitsubishi Bank. The
complaint alleged that Mitsubishi Bank willfully interfered with Banaitis' employment contract, and that the
Bank of California attempted to induce Banaitis to breach
his fiduciary duties to customers and discharged him
when he refused. The jury awarded Banaitis compensatory and punitive damages. After resolution of all appeals
and post-trial motions, the parties settled. The defendants
paid $4,864,547 to Banaitis; and, following the formula set
forth in the contingent-fee contract, the defendants paid
an additional $3,864,012 directly to Banaitis' attorney.
Banaitis did not include the amount paid to his attorney
in gross income on his federal income tax return, and the
Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency. The Tax
Court upheld the Commissioner's determination, but the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 340 F. 3d
1074 (2003). In contrast to the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, the Banaitis court viewed state law as
pivotal. Where state law confers on the attorney no special property rights in his fee, the court said, the whole
amount of the judgment or settlement ordinarily is included in the plaintiff's gross income. Id., at 1081. Oregon state law, however, like the law of some other States,
grants attorneys a superior hen in the contingent-fee
portion of any recovery. As a result, the court held, contingent-fee agreements under Oregon law operate not as
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an anticipatory assignment of the client's income but as a
partial transfer to the attorney of some of the client's
property in the lawsuit.
II
To clarify why the issue here is of any consequence for
tax purposes, two preliminary observations are useful.
The first concerns the general issue of deductibility. For
the tax years in question the legal expenses in these cases
could have been taken as miscellaneous itemized deductions subject to the ordinary requirements, 26 U. S. C.
§§67-68 (2000 ed. and Supp. I), but doing so would have
been of no help to respondents because of the operation of
the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). For noncorporate
individual taxpayers, the AMT establishes a tax liability
floor equal to 26 percent of the taxpayer's "alternative
minimum taxable income" (minus specified exemptions)
up to $175,000, plus 28 percent of alternative minimum
taxable income over $175,000. §§55(a), (b) (2000 ed.).
Alternative minimum taxable income, unlike ordinary
gross income, does not allow any miscellaneous itemized
deductions. §§56(b)(l)(A)(i).
Second, after these cases arose Congress enacted the
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 118 Stat. 1418.
Section 703 of the Act amended the Code by adding
§62(a)(19). Id., at 1546. The amendment allows a taxpayer, in computing adjusted gross income, to deduct
"attorney fees and court costs paid by, or on behalf of, the
taxpayer in connection with any action involving a claim
of unlawful discrimination." Ibid.
The Act defines
"unlawful discrimination" to include a number of specific
federal statutes, §§62(e)(l) to (16), any federal whistleblower statute, §62(e)(17), and any federal, state, or local
law "providing for the enforcement of civil rights" or "regulating any aspect of the employment relationship . . . or
prohibiting the discharge of an employee, the discrimina-
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tion against an employee, or any other form of retaliation
or reprisal against an employee for asserting rights or
taking other actions permitted by law," §62(e)(18). Id., at
1547-1548. These deductions are permissible even when
the AMT applies. Had the Act been in force for the transactions now under review, these cases likely would not
have arisen. The Act is not retroactive, however, so while
it may cover future taxpayers in respondents' position, it
does not pertain here.
Ill
The Internal Revenue Code defines "gross income" for
federal tax purposes as "all income from whatever source
derived." 26 U. S. C. §61(a). The definition extends
broadly to all economic gains not otherwise exempted.
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U. S. 426, 429-30
(1955); Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U. S. 28, 49 (1949).
A taxpayer cannot exclude an economic gain from gross
income by assigning the gain in advance to another party.
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. I l l (1930); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591, 604 (1948); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S.
112, 116-117 (1940). The rationale for the so-called anticipatory assignment of income doctrine is the principle that
gains should be taxed "to those who earn them," Lucas,
supra, at 114, a maxim we have called "the first principle of
income taxation," Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U. S.
733, 739-740 (1949). The anticipatory assignment doctrine
is meant to prevent taxpayers from avoiding taxation
through "arrangements and contracts however skillfully
devised to prevent [income] when paid from vesting even for
a second in the man who earned it." Lucas, 281 U. S., at
115. The rule is preventative and motivated by administrative as well as substantive concerns, so we do not inquire
whether any particular assignment has a discernible tax
avoidance purpose. As Lucas explained, "no distinction can
be taken according to the motives leading to the arrange-

Cite as: 543 U. S.

(2005)

7

Opinion of the Court

ment by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree
from that on which they grew." Ibid.
Respondents argue that the anticipatory assignment
doctrine is a judge-made antifraud rule with no relevance
to contingent-fee contracts of the sort at issue here. The
Commissioner maintains that a contingent-fee agreement
should be viewed as an anticipatory assignment to the
attorney of a portion of the client's income from any litigation recovery. We agree with the Commissioner.
In an ordinary case attribution of income is resolved by
asking whether a taxpayer exercises complete dominion
over the income in question. Glenshaw Glass Co., supra,
at 431; see also Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power &
Light Co., 493 U. S. 203, 209 (1990); Commissioner v. First
Security Bank of Utah, N. A , 405 U. S. 394, 403 (1972). In
the context of anticipatory assignments, however, the
assignor often does not have dominion over the income at
the moment of receipt. In that instance the question
becomes whether the assignor retains dominion over the
income-generating asset, because the taxpayer "who owns
or controls the source of the income, also controls the
disposition of that which he could have received himself
and diverts the payment from himself to others as the
means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants." Horst,
supra, at 116-117. See also Lucas, supra, at 114-115;
Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122, 124-125 (1940); Sunnen, supra, at 604. Looking to control over the incomegenerating asset, then, preserves the principle that income
should be taxed to the party who earns the income and
enjoys the consequent benefits.
In the case of a litigation recovery the incomegenerating asset is the cause of action that derives from
the plaintiffs legal injury. The plaintiff retains dominion
over this asset throughout the litigation. We do not understand respondents to argue otherwise. Rather, respondents advance two counterarguments. First, they say
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that, in contrast to the bond coupons assigned in Horst,
the value of a legal claim is speculative at the moment of
assignment, and may be worth nothing at all. Second,
respondents insist that the claimant's legal injury is not
the only source of the ultimate recovery. The attorney,
according to respondents, also contributes incomegenerating assets—effort and expertise—without which
the claimant likely could not prevail. On these premises
respondents urge us to treat a contingent-fee agreement
as establishing, for tax purposes, something like a joint
venture or partnership in which the client and attorney
combine their respective assets—the client's claim and the
attorney's skill—and apportion any resulting profits.
We reject respondents' arguments. Though the value of
the plaintiffs claim may be speculative at the moment the
fee agreement is signed, the anticipatory assignment
doctrine is not limited to instances when the precise dollar
value of the assigned income is known in advance. Lucas,
supra; United States v. Bayse, 410 U. S. 441, 445, 450-452
(1973). Though Horst involved an anticipatory assignment of a predetermined sum to be paid on a specific date,
the holding in that case did not depend on ascertaining a
liquidated amount at the time of assignment. In the cases
before us, as in Horst, the taxpayer retained control over
the income-generating asset, diverted some of the income
produced to another party, and realized a benefit by doing
so. As Judge Wesley correctly concluded in a recent case,
the rationale of Horst applies fully to a contingentfee contract. Raymond v. United States, 355 F. 3d, at
115-116. That the amount of income the asset would
produce was uncertain at the moment of assignment is of
no consequence.
We further reject the suggestion to treat the attorneyclient relationship as a sort of business partnership or
joint venture for tax purposes. The relationship between
client and attorney, regardless of the variations in particu-
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lar compensation agreements or the amount of skill and
effort the attorney contributes, is a quintessential principal-agent relationship. Restatement (Second) of Agency
§1, Comment e (1957) (hereinafter Restatement); ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3, Comments
1, 1.7 1 (2002). The client may rely on the attorney's
expertise and special skills to achieve a result the client
could not achieve alone. That, however, is true of most
principal-agent relationships, and it does not alter the fact
that the client retains ultimate dominion and control over
the underlying claim. The control is evident when it is
noted that, although the attorney can make tactical decisions without consulting the client, the plaintiff still must
determine whether to settle or proceed to judgment and
make, as well, other critical decisions. Even where the
attorney exercises independent judgment without supervision by, or consultation with, the client, the attorney, as
an agent, is obligated to act solely on behalf of, and for the
exclusive benefit of, the client-principal, rather than for
the benefit of the attorney or any other party. Restatement §§13, 39, 387.
The attorney is an agent who is duty bound to act only
in the interests of the principal, and so it is appropriate to
treat the full amount of the recovery as income to the
principal. In this respect Judge Posner's observation is
apt: "[T]he contingent-fee lawyer [is not] a joint owner of
his client's claim in the legal sense any more than the
commission salesman is a joint owner of his employer's
accounts receivable." Kenseth, 259 F. 3d, at 883. In both
cases a principal relies on an agent to realize an economic
gain, and the gain realized by the agent's efforts is income
to the principal. The portion paid to the agent may be
deductible, but absent some other provision of law it is not
excludable from the principal's gross income.
This rule applies whether or not the attorney-client
contract or state law confers any special rights or protec-
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tions on the attorney, so long as these protections do not
alter the fundamental principal-agent character of the
relationship. Cf. Restatement §13, Comment b, and §14G,
Comment a (an agency relationship is created where a
principal assigns a chose in action to an assignee for collection and grants the assignee a security interest in the
claim against the assignor's debtor in order to compensate
the assignee for his collection efforts). State laws vary
with respect to the strength of an attorney's security
interest in a contingent fee and the remedies available to
an attorney should the client discharge or attempt to
defraud the attorney. No state laws of which we are
aware, however, even those that purport to give attorneys
an "ownership" interest in their fees, e.g., 340 F. 3d, at
1082-1083 (discussing Oregon law); Cotnam, 263 F. 2d, at
125 (discussing Alabama law), convert the attorney from
an agent to a partner.
Respondents and their amid propose other theories to
exclude fees from income or permit deductibility. These
suggestions include: (1) The contingent-fee agreement
establishes a Subchapter K partnership under 26 U. S. C.
§§702, 704, and 761, Brief for Respondent Banaitis in No.
03-907, p. 5—21; (2) litigation recoveries are proceeds from
disposition of property, so the attorney's fee should be
subtracted as a capital expense pursuant to §§1001, 1012,
and 1016, Brief for Association of Trial Lawyers of
America as Amicus Curiae 23-28, Brief for Charles
Davenport as Amicus Curiae 3-13; and (3) the fees are
deductible reimbursed employee business expenses under
§62(a)(2)(A) (2000 ed. and Supp. I), Brief for Stephen
Cohen as Amicus Curiae. These arguments, it appears,
are being presented for the first time to this Court. We
are especially reluctant to entertain novel propositions of
law with broad implications for the tax system that were
not advanced in earlier stages of the litigation and not
examined by the Courts of Appeals. We decline comment
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on these supplementary theories. In addition, we do not
reach the instance where a relator pursues a claim on
behalf of the United States. Brief for Taxpayers Against
Fraud Education Fund as Amicus Curiae 10-20.

IV
The foregoing suffices to dispose of Banaitis' case.
Banks' case, however, involves a further consideration.
Banks brought his claims under federal statutes that
authorize fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs' attorneys.
He contends that application of the anticipatory assignment principle would be inconsistent with the purpose of
statutory fee shifting provisions. See Venegas v. Mitchell,
495 U. S. 82, 86 (1990) (observing that statutory fees enable
"plaintiffs to employ reasonably competent lawyers without
cost to themselves if they prevail"). In the federal system
statutory fees are typically awarded by the court under
the lodestar approach, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424,
433 (1983), and the plaintiff usually has little control over
the amount awarded. Sometimes, as when the plaintiff
seeks only injunctive relief, or when the statute caps plaintiffs' recoveries, or when for other reasons damages are
substantially less than attorney's fees, court-awarded attorney's fees can exceed a plaintiffs monetary recovery. See,
e.g., Riverside v. Rivera, All U.S. 561, 564-565 (1986)
(compensatory and punitive damages of $33,350; attorney's
fee award of $245,456.25). Treating the fee award as income to the plaintiff in such cases, it is argued, can lead to
the perverse result that the plaintiff loses money by winning
the suit. Furthermore, it is urged that treating statutory fee
awards as income to plaintiffs would undermine the effectiveness of fee-shifting statutes in deputizing plaintiffs and
their lawyers to act as private attorneys general.
We need not address these claims. After Banks settled
his case, the fee paid to his attorney was calculated solely
on the basis of the private contingent-fee contract. There
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was no court-ordered fee award, nor was there any indication in Banks' contract with his attorney, or in the settlement agreement with the defendant, that the contingent
fee paid to Banks' attorney was in lieu of statutory fees
Banks might otherwise have been entitled to recover.
Also, the amendment added by the American Jobs Creation Act redresses the concern for many, perhaps most,
claims governed by fee-shifting statutes.
*
*
*
For the reasons stated, the judgments of the Courts of
Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits are reversed, and
the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the decision of these
cases.

